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Introduction
In this paper we continue our research into the Czech social and tax systems and their
impact on income distribution. An introductory study on this subject was published in 2001 in
which we examined in detail the social and tax systems and their impact on poverty in the
Czech Republic.
1 In that paper we focused on a single year 1999 as we did not have a longer
series of data. In this paper we use regular household surveys, organized and published by the
Czech Statistical Office (CSO), for years 1999-2002. This longer time span allows us to
identify some trends in the Czech social security system and their impact on well-being of
various income groups. Namely, our goal is to show the impact of social benefits and income
tax deductible allowances on income distribution in the Czech Republic and cost of these
programs.
 2
As we noted in the 2001 paper, “targeting of majority of social programs [in 1999] is
quite good. More than one fourth of all goes to households in the lowest income decile. Three
fourth of all expenses goes to households in the lower half of income spectrum.”
In this paper, we find that while the total cost of the Czech social security system were
not escalating in the period of 1999-2002, the illness benefit – already the largest spending
program – rose by enormous 72% in these four years, as the benefit was made more generous
in 2000. This largesse, costing the state budget as much as CZK 28bn in 2002, failed,
however, to improve income of the poorest households. We also find that spending on more
focused programs (social supplement and parental allowance) rose the least while the worst
focused programs (unemployment and illness benefits) rose faster (significantly faster in the
case of illness benefits).
Last but not least, we analyzed the impact of tax deductions on the income distribution
in the Czech Republic. These deductions represent a massive transfer, comparable to all
social benefits combined. Tax deductions, due to the Czech system whereby deductions were
made from the tax base, not the tax due, were less effective in redistributing to poor
households. Our analysis moreover shows, that the impact of tax deductions on income of the
poorest decile fell significantly over the period of 1999-2002.
The paper is organized as follows: in the first section, we briefly describe the Czech
social security system and its cost in the period 1999-2002. In the second chapter, we look at
the effects of the system on the income of typified Czech households. In the third chapter we
turn to the microeconomic data and discuss merits of the household survey data and their
developments in the analyzed period. Fourth chapter adds tax deductions to the discussion.
Fifth chapter presents the analysis of the distributive impact of various social benefits on
Czech households. The sixth chapter presents a discussion of budgetary cost of these
programs and the following chapter attempts to measure efficiency of various programs and
their developments in the period of 1999-2002. We close the paper by brief conclusions and
tentative policy recommendations.
1. Social Security System in the Czech Republic
The new social system was created in the early 1990´s as a social safety net for
everyone in need. When analyzing social security we concentrate on following social
                                                          
1 See Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 12/2001.
2 Pension system analysis could be found e.g. in (Schneider, 2001) or (Schneider, 2003).3
benefits: child allowance, social supplement, parental allowances, other social benefits,
unemployment benefits and illness benefit as they are included in the household budget
survey.
3 Hereby analyzed benefits imply state expenditures of more than CZK 55bn in 1999
rising to almost CZK 75bn in 2002. As a share in GDP it represented 3,0% in 1999 rising
eventually to 3,3% in 2002. The first four items are formally part of social support system,
while unemployment benefit and illness benefit are part of social security system. The social
support system has the direct goal to increase income of poorest groups in society and it is
naturally subject of our concern. The social security system plays double role: on one side it
imitates insurance, when higher contributions means higher benefits, on the other side
computation of benefits is so much distorted that “social insurance” is more another tool for
social redistribution than some type of insurance and we thus include it in our analysis.
4
The state social support, created in 1995, consists of nine different benefits, three of
them means-tested, five untested and one combined (see below). The benefits might be
separated into two main groups: those supporting families (child allowances, parental
allowances, social allowance for childcare) and those aimed at poor families (social
supplement, various housing benefits). Besides, there are two untested benefits, as to illustrate
the cradle-to-crave approach of the Czech social security system: birth and funeral benefits.
From the fiscal point of view, child allowances were easily the biggest scheme, with annual
costs around CZK 13bn, followed by the parental allowances (CZK 8bn) and social
supplement (approx. CZK 6bn). The remaining schemes are marginal in fiscal terms, but
perhaps substantial in social terms.
The whole construction of the social support allowances is based on the legal minimum
living standards. Minimum living standards serve as a basis for both the determination of the
income levels up to which the allowance is due, and the determination of the amount of
allowance (in terms of the fixed multiples of the minimum living standards).
5 This way, both
the levels of benefits and the eligibility criteria are automatically indexed whenever minimum
living standards are changed.
  Means-tested family benefits
  i)  children allowances -- supplementary income for the purpose of raising a child.
Annual costs in 1999 were CZK 12.5bn. Since January 1993, the amount of the monthly
allowance has been a function of the age of the child, ranging from 340 CZK (for a child less
than six years of age) to 490 CZK (for a child over 15 years of age).
6  Since October 1995, the
size of the benefit depends also on the household income.
  Families with income of up to triple of the minimum living standard for their type of
family are eligible for some allowance.  If the total income is less than 1.10*MLS for their
family type, the benefit equals 0.32*MLS of a child for each dependent child. Families with
income in the range of 1.10-1.80*MLS are eligible for 0.28*MLS of a child for each
                                                          
3 In order to limit the scope of the analysis, we have left out most of the Social Insurance system, such as old-age
and invalidity pensions, the whole range of benefits for disabled persons as these have to engage many specific
features and aims.
4 The same could be said about Old-Age Pension System, which the biggest social programs in all OECD
countries. For its size and specific purpose we do not include it in our analysis.
5 For a detaild discussin of minimum living standard, their developments and interactions with the Czech labor
market, see Schneider (2004c).
 
6 Before 1993 the allowance was a function of the total number of children in the family, where the marginal
increment was positive.4
dependent child. Families with income in the range 1.80-3.00*MLS are eligible for
0.14*MLS of a child for each dependent child. Entitlement lasts as long as the child is
dependent. A parent has to re-apply each year and her income during the preceding year is
tested. A dependent child is defined as any unmarried child under the age of 26 years as long
as he/she is a student in a defined type of secondary or higher educational institution or
cannot (due to a long-term illness or disability) earn any income. Until the age of 18 also a
registered unemployed not receiving unemployment benefits is considered to be a dependent
child. 
7
  ii) social supplement when caring for a child -- additional supplementary income for
the purpose of raising a child paid to  a family with at least one dependent child and having an
income below 1.6*MLS. Entitlement: a parent has to re-apply quarterly; income of the










  where: SA = social allowance when caring for a child
  MLS1 = sum of individual minimum living standards of all dependent children
  MLS2 = minimum living standard of the family (sum of individual standards and 
  household minimum)
  I = family income
 
  iii) housing allowances -- A household is eligible when the joint income of all persons
permanently residing in a flat falls below 1.4*MLS for this type of a household, irrespective
of the ownership type of the flat (also inhabitants of the self-owned flats are eligible) and
irrespective of the actual housing expenses. A household has to re-apply quarterly and the
income of the preceding quarter is tested. The level of the benefit is scaled to three income
bands, i.e. whether family income falls below 1.0, 1.2 or 1.4 MLS.
  iv) transportation benefit -- is a benefit introduced after the subsidies to pupil and
student transport fares were phased out and it is partly means tested and partly untested. Any
dependent child studying in a municipality different from his/her permanent residence
municipality is eligible. Families, where children did not complete compulsory schooling (9
years), are eligible for the benefit irrespective of the family income. If a dependent child
studies at the secondary or higher educational institution, only a family with income below
2.0*MLS is eligible. Construction of the benefit level is based on the price of public transport
and the resulting sum depends on the type of a school attended and regularity of
transportation (daily, weekly, etc.). Entitlement is established yearly.
  Transportation benefit is seen as the most administrative complicated and probably not
well targeted (no data is available, as the benefit is not observed by the household surveys
                                                          
7 The child allowances are formally means-tested but in reality 90% of families qualify for a benefit and roughly
50% for the highest of benefits. They are also unnecessary long in terms of child age – until 26 years if a child
keeps studying. The child allowances are often combined with the social supplement that is more targeted at
poor but it is not clear why to have two programs at all.
8 The benefit is scaled up further when either the children or the parents are ill with a long-term illness or
disabled, or when the household is formed by a single parent (the scaling coefficients are different for each
situation).5
(see below). Thus, costs of the scheme – almost CZK 1bn in 1999 – are difficult to measure
against any measurable outcome.
  Non-tested family benefits:
  i) parental allowance -- a payment to a parent caring personally full-time for a child 4
years old or younger or for a handicapped child under the age of 7 which is not placed in
nursery, kindergarten or any other institution for preschool children. A parent is eligible for
the benefits unless he/she receives health insurance, unemployment benefits or maternity
leave benefits. Until 2004, the parent might earn the sum lower or equal to his/her personal
minimum living standard at most in order to qualify for the benefit.
9 The size of the benefit
was defined as 1.1 times the personal MLS of the parent.
10
  ii) benefit at the birth of a child -- is a one-time benefit provided upon the birth of a
child. The size of the benefit is a multiple of the individual MLS of a newly born child and
depends on a number of children born simultaneously, rising nonlinearly.
11
  iii) lump sum funeral benefit -- is paid to a person that organized a funeral and is fixed
at 5,000 CZK.
  All of the social support benefits are non-taxable but are included in the income of a
household applying for the income support under the system of Social Assistance.
  The Unemployment Compensation System
  An unemployment compensation system (UCS) was put into effect January 1, 1990 and
it has undergone several changes since.  It began as a generous one until reforms put into
place on January 1, 1992 made the level of benefits (base on wage replacement rates) and
eligibility criteria more restrictive.  In January 1996, new reforms increased the replacement
rates for the new entrants and certain other groups of unemployed and widened again the
eligibility criteria.
  In January 1, 1996 the base for the maximum changed to the minimum living standard
for an adult in a one-person household and currently the ceiling is 2.5 of the MLS (2.9 of
MLS for unemployed in a retraining course). There is no minimum benefit since 1992.
12
Benefits are not indexed to inflation, nor are they taxed.
  Illness benefits
  Illness benefits substitute lost income during short illness. They are financed from a
special surcharge on the payroll tax and are redistributive in nature, as their level is topped.
An ill worker is entitled to the benefits from the very first day of his/her illness and there is no
cost-sharing by employers. It is no surprise, thus, that the system is often used for short-term
                                                          
9 As of 2004, this provision was scrapped and the parental benefit is no longertested on parents´ income. Parents
must not, however, put their children to a permanent, state sponsored kindergarten.
10 The parental benefit is particularly long (four years). Long tenure of the benefits was meant to shield women
from high unemployment but as any deformation of the labor market disadvantage women who often find it
difficult to return to the labor market after raising one or even two children. Therefore, the system lowers labor
force at high costs to the taxpayer.
 
11 4.0*MLS when one child was born, 5.0*MLS per child when two children were born and 9.0*MLS per child
when three or more children were born.
 
12 Unemployed are eligible to the minimum living standards, discussed above.6
off-loading of unneeded workers. On average, 7% of workers claim a illness on any working
day in the Czech Republic.
  The benefit formula is rather complex, as it calculates the daily benefit level from
average gross income in last three months. While first CZK 360 of the daily income comes
fully into the formula, only 60% of the income in the CZK 360-540 does and income above
the CZK 540 daily (CZK 16 thousand monthly, or 150% of the 1999 average wage) is
forfeited completely when the illness benefit is calculated. The benefit is then equal to 69% of
the adjusted income (50% for first three days). The costs of the illness benefit system,
together with other social programs, are summarized below in the table 1.














1999 12,500 6,251 7,718 4,000 16,467 5,700
2000 12,748 6,199 7,692 5,038 23,716 5,680
2001 12,799 6,041 7,701 6,055 25,716 5,229




106,8% 100,3% 103,9% 151,3% 172,0% 108,9%
 
2. Effects of the system
It is not easy to assess the combined effects of various social programs, as benefits are
often means-tested and always depends on the family size. However, in order to understand
the system impact on the Czech labor market and the efficiency of the system, it is necessary
to model its functioning.
We have thus constructed two “typical families” consisting of two adults and two
children (or one child only). A two-child family is entitled to a series of benefits: first it gets
children allowances if its income is not above 3 MLS. If the family income is below 1.4 of
MLS, it is entitled to the social supplement and housing benefit. Until its income is below 1.6
MLS, the family gets also further “housing supplement”. The younger child is entitled to a
transportation benefits no matter what is the family income, the older, however, gets this
benefit only if the family income is lower than 2 MLS. Altogether, the family could receive as
many as seven different benefits of the state social support system (we leave aside the social
insurance system). Of course, if the social support benefits are not enough to lift the family
above the minimum living standard, its income is topped by the social assistance to reach the
MLS. The following Chart 1 illustrates the system:7
Chart 1: Social benefits of a family of four (CZK for multiples of MLS)
Note: the table does not reflect the "top-up" component of the social system that tops income of this
model family to CZK 11,030.
  The complexity of social benefits as just described deforms obviously incentives to
work, as raising the family income above some of thresholds eliminates some social benefits.
“Imputed tax rate”, i.e. the rate at which social benefits are withdrawn when work income
rises is as high as 100% for income up until 50% of the family MLS. In other words, all work
income lower than 50% of the family MLS is “100% compensated” by withdrawing social
benefits.
  Only after this threshold is reached, the family may actually boost its income by
accepting a job. The average “withdrawn rate” remains high, however, and gets to 50% when
the work income reaches MLS. It remains at this level until the work income crosses the
national average wage and only then slowly declines further – see Chart 2.. On top of it, the
marginal withdrawn rate reaches as much as 80% as various benefits are withdrawn at 1.2,
1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0 and finally 3 multiples of the MLS. The average “withdrawn rate” hovers
around 50% well until the work income reaches 2 MLS
 








0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
Child Allowance (1 elementary, 1 secondary school) Social Supplement (1 elementary, 1 secondary school)
Housing Benefit 3-4 member family Transport Benefit (1 elementary, 1 secondary school)
Housing Supplement average benefit Compensation for heat average benefit
Compensation for rent average benefit8
  Chart 2: Withdrawal "tax" rates for a family of four (% for multiples of MLS)
  It seems, thus, fair to say that the effects of the social assistance and social support are
quite detrimental for the work incentives, especially for bigger families who face drastic
“withdrawal rates” when they seek a job. Please note that we take the wage in net terms, i.e.
after income tax and social contributions were paid. While low wage may be tax-exempt (see
below more on tax credits) social contributions are paid from each wage and reach 47.5% of
the before-the-tax wage (out of which 12.5% is paid by the employee and 35% by the
employer) – see below. This further complicates employment of low-skilled workers.
 
3. Statistical data
In order to get representative data on households' income we use the household survey,
a regular and long-term panel study of more than 3,000 Czech households provided by the
Czech Statistical Office (CSO). Despite the fact that this survey is mainly concerned with
household consumption we believe it can be used for analyzing income distribution of Czech
households, even though we are aware that they are not strictly representative. Household
budget survey, for example, does not include households where the head is unemployed or
where the head is retired but other members are employed.
13
The household survey is conducted on a monthly basis and for our purposes we used the
period of 1999-2002 – the most recent available. The survey is representative with respect to
the income, age, social status and number of children. Thus, it is very likely representative
with respect to many social benefits, as they are mostly based on the income status of the
family or on the number of children in the family. The one benefit that should be treated
carefully is the illness benefit, as there is no apparent link to characteristics that are being
                                                          
13 According to some researchers – e.g. J.Večerník (1998) – the household budget survey does not reflect proper
income differentiation in the Czech society. For our analysis it would be appropriate to compare results of




















targeted by the household survey. However, as the table 2 shows, a half of households
typically receive the benefit at some point. Moreover, beneficiaries are evenly distributed
among all deciles, so the illness benefits seem to be widespread and thus the survey covers
them in a proper manner. We have excluded, however, a variable "other social assistance"
that was received by mere 3% of the sample and in some deciles it was almost non-existent.
The benefit had a little impact on overall distribution; nevertheless, it was important for
families who actually were receiving it.















































D1 185 4205 147 4004 94 8780 135 2470 33 4751 117 5615 226 5413
D2 160 3843 96 2389 63 9269 93 1850 31 5016 102 5648 207 5704
D3 144 3690 58 1916 44 9102 64 1258 22 4728 97 4832 206 6008
D4 149 3609 33 1001 31 7528 57 1561 16 2614 114 4379 218 6192
D5 110 3481 20 1133 21 6274 49 1267 13 2950 99 5391 204 6260
D6 111 3167 8 343 10 7324 28 1059 15 4811 115 3883 212 6476
D7 81 2568 3 562 8 6628 16 1804 13 3527 114 3558 208 6724
D8 42 2203 2 1250 2 11597 15 1797 11 4229 107 4263 203 6767
D9 29 2040 2 2512 9 6004 11 3135 12 2798 96 5075 203 6927
D10 7 2211 1 1678 3 8796 5 2616 3 3059 90 2949 202 7944
1018 370 285 473 169 1051 2089
* Average benefits is calculated as an average from those households actually receiving the benefit.
As we were mainly concerned with distribution impact of the social security system
(and tax credits as well) we used a constructed "market income" as a base for sorting
households. The "market income" is calculated from the household survey where the reported
net income is adjusted for received social transfers and for paid taxes. The resulting "market
income" should simulate income the household would have had if there had been no
government taxes and transfers. We should note, though, that taxes paid include in our
concept also social contributions. In this respect, we had to recalculate social contributions
paid by employees, as they report only a part of the social contributions as the bulk is "paid
for" by employers. In fact, though, the whole tax burden is employees' so we have increased
their paid taxes by amount of social contributions paid by their employees.
14 The survey
covers households (as opposed to individuals) but it provides extensive demographic and
income statistics, so it is rather straightforward to construct a distribution of incomes on
individual basis, as we assumed that all family members have the same share in the family
income. It is often argued that larger families enjoy “returns to scale” as some household
expenses are similar for one-member family and for more numerous families. To that extent,
the CSO provides “weights” of additional family members: while the first member counts for
one unit, the remaining adults for 0.7 and children of age 0-13 for 0.5 of the unit. We used
this "adjusted consumption scale" in our calculations.
                                                          
14  Note, that self-employed pay (and report) the whole social contributions, so we needed no adjustment in those
cases where the household head was self-employed.10
While this survey probably underweights both richest households (that have little
incentive to cooperate with the CSO) and poorest households (that are difficult to reach and
that may find the CSO questionnaires too complicated), it does provide the most
comprehensive and complex set on information households' incomes and expenditures.
4. Tax deductible allowances
The Czech tax code is often blamed for too high complexity and unnecessary high
number of loopholes. However, compared to other more developed countries tax codes, the
Czech one is still in its infancy. However, the state does extend tax credits to some preferred
activities: thus interest paid on mortgage is tax deductible, some fringe benefits are tax free
(transport subsidies, catering, pension insurance and since 2001 also life insurance). There are
various income groups that qualify for a tax credit; however, from the point of view of the
social security only few make any impact.
Tax deductible allowances are called “tax expenditures” in the economic literature,
because a tax payer saves money through this mechanism. We could get the same result if the
total income is taxed and “tax deductible allowance” would be paid directly from the state
budget. But the tax-deductible allowance is considered to be more efficient and
administratively friendly tool. Tax deductible allowance brings higher nominal gain to higher
income groups, because it lowers their tax in higher tax brackets.
15
Most important are tax credits: on own “needs” on children and dependent spouses,
summarized in Table 3. These benefits are, as the whole Czech tax system, exclusively
individual, i.e. any member of a family can claim them, but on his/her income only. Their
fiscal costs are substantial, albeit only estimated. Using very simple model,
16 we estimate that
the individual tax-deductible allowances were worth CZK 33bn in 1999 and 2000 and about
CZK 36bn in 2001 and 2002. Children and spouse tax deductible allowances cost the state
budget further CZK 17bn. It is, thus, important to look at the tax allowances´ distributive
aspects as well.
Table 3: Main tax allowances and their cost (CZK annually)
1999 2000 2001 2002
Individual
tax credit
34 920 34 920 38 040 38 040
Child credit 21 600 21 600 23 520 23 520
Spouse
credit
19 884 19 884 21 720 21 720
Total cost
(CZK bn)
48,5 48,8 51,9 51,8
Source: Ministry of Finance, own estimates
Clearly, these tax credits are regressive in nature, but their distribution impact is rarely
analyzed. Given the fact that the Czech tax system is progressive with marginal rate rising
from 0% to 32% (and to 40% until 2000) the tax credits distribute disproportionate benefits to
                                                          
15  If each individual can deduct CZK 34 920 from its labor income, an individual in the highest tax bracket
saves little less than CZK 14 000. An individual in the lowest tax bracket of 15% would save only a little more
than CZK 5 000.
16 We estimated budgetary costs of individual allowances using the labor force statistics. The children and
spouse allowances were estimated using the number of children and the average number of children in a family.11
well-off. Their administration, it is claimed, is cheaper than the social security’s and they do
not discourage from accepting a formal employment. However, there has been no analysis as
to what extent these tax credits fulfill government goals in social policy.
5. Redistribution effects of the system
In our analysis we tried to show a) how efficient are various social programs in lifting
net income of households, b) what are the costs of this. The following Table 4 summarizes
our results concerning increase in net income of ten deciles of households. The household
survey distinguishes six social security schemes: child allowances, social supplement,
parental allowances, unemployment benefits and a group of other social support. We also add
the tax-deductible allowance, although this is a special program treated separately.
As the following table shows, in general terms the Czech social security system is rather
well targeted at the poorest decile whose income was boosted by 30-40% in various years.
The system was less generous to the second poorest decile that gets "only" 12-19% increase in
income. The third decile gets a 8-12% boost. The boost then uniformly decreases to about 5%
for the fifth decile and eventually to about 1% for the richest decile.
The dynamics of the system’s redistribution function is rather complex. Year 2000 was
marked by a massive shift vis-à-vis 1999 towards the poorest decile: its income boost
increased by more than 5 percentage points. At the same year, al deciles but the richest one
received a lesser boost in their incomes from the combined social benefits, the biggest loser
being the second decile that lost almost 7 percentage points. These changes were driven
mainly by the illness benefits developments, but the second decile lost in all social benefits
(most surprising and dramatic is the collapse of unemployment benefit – while in 1999, 21%
of total unemployment benefits went to the second poorest decile, in 2000 it was only 7%).
In the following year 2001, the poorest decile fared much worse: its income rose after
social transfers by less than 30%, due to the uniform fall of all social benefits. The second
poorest decile recovered a little, mainly due to higher illness benefits. Other deciles lost
again, marking the year as the least generous in the analyzed period.
The last year in our sample, 2002, saw a small improvement for all deciles, most
pronounced for the second and the third decile whose incomes were increased by social
benefits by 16.3% and 10.4% respectively, i.e. by almost 3 percentage points more than in
2001. As always, the illness benefits were behind higher social benefits in 2002.12
Table 4: Income boosts received by different deciles from various schemes per





















Decile 1 7.6% 6.1% 8.3% 3.6% 1.8% 6.4% 33.8% 11.8%
Decile 2 4.7% 1.7% 5.3% 1.3% 1.3% 4.8% 19.2% 9.0%
Decile 3 3.4% 0.7% 3.1% 0.5% 0.6% 3.6% 12.1% 8.2%
Decile 4 3.0% 0.2% 1.4% 0.5% 0.2% 3.0% 8.4% 7.6%
Decile 5 2.2% 0.1% 0.7% 0.3% 0.3% 3.0% 6.6% 6.8%
Decile 6 1.7% 0.0% 0.4% 0.1% 0.4% 2.0% 4.8% 6.4%
Decile 7 0.9% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 1.9% 3.4% 6.0%
Decile 8 0.4% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 1.9% 2.7% 5.4%
Decile 9 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 1.7% 2.3% 4.8%





















Decile 1 7.9% 6.0% 8.1% 4.5% 1.6% 9.8% 39.1% 8.9%
Decile 2 3.3% 0.9% 3.4% 0.7% 0.4% 3.4% 12.4% 5.2%
Decile 3 2.6% 0.3% 2.3% 0.4% 0.8% 3.7% 10.3% 5.2%
Decile 4 2.3% 0.1% 0.7% 0.3% 0.6% 3.1% 7.2% 5.3%
Decile 5 1.6% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 2.6% 5.3% 5.0%
Decile 6 1.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.3% 1.8% 3.8% 4.9%
Decile 7 0.7% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 2.5% 3.8% 4.5%
Decile 8 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 2.4% 3.3% 4.1%
Decile 9 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 1.6% 2.0% 4.0%





















Decile 1 6.0% 4.9% 6.3% 3.2% 1.3% 6.9% 29.3% 8.3%
Decile 2 3.6% 1.1% 3.0% 1.1% 0.5% 3.9% 13.6% 5.6%
Decile 3 2.1% 0.1% 1.8% 0.3% 0.5% 2.6% 7.8% 4.8%
Decile 4 1.8% 0.1% 0.8% 0.2% 0.4% 2.4% 5.7% 4.4%
Decile 5 1.3% 0.0% 0.6% 0.2% 0.4% 1.9% 4.4% 3.8%
Decile 6 0.9% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 1.8% 3.1% 3.8%
Decile 7 0.4% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 1.9% 2.9% 3.6%
Decile 8 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 1.5% 2.0% 3.3%
Decile 9 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 1.1% 1.3% 3.1%





















Decile 1 6.0% 4.6% 5.2% 3.4% 1.8% 9.2% 31.0% 7.5%
Decile 2 3.7% 1.4% 3.3% 1.4% 0.7% 5.6% 16.3% 5.4%
Decile 3 2.6% 0.5% 1.8% 0.9% 0.7% 3.6% 10.4% 4.6%
Decile 4 2.0% 0.2% 1.2% 0.5% 0.7% 3.0% 7.7% 4.2%
Decile 5 1.4% 0.0% 0.9% 0.2% 0.6% 3.0% 6.3% 3.9%
Decile 6 1.1% 0.0% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 2.1% 4.3% 3.7%
Decile 7 0.7% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 2.1% 3.6% 3.4%
Decile 8 0.4% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 1.7% 2.5% 3.1%
Decile 9 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 1.6% 2.0% 3.0%
Decile 10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.9% 2.5%
When we compare various social programs, we may identify three rather well targeted
programs and three wider spread schemes. Best "targeted" social programs are the social13
supplement and the parental allowance scheme. The social supplement advances income of
the poorest decile by 5-6% and all but ignores the six richest deciles altogether. However, the
social supplement was somewhat losing its income-increasing power vis-à-vis the poorest
decile (it lifted its income by 6.1% in 1999 but only by 4.6% in 2002). Perhaps surprisingly,
the parental allowance scheme is targeted very well: it moved up income of the poorest decile
by 5-8% and the second decile's income by about 3%, making little impact elsewhere. But
again, the poorest decile fared best in 1999, when its income was lifted by 8.3% by the
parental allowance benefit, but the increase slided to 5.6% in 2002. The “other social support”
category showed as a rather targeted benefit as well, but its analysis is complicated by its
composite character.
Child allowances are rather problematic: they do distribute towards the poorest decile
(rise of income by 6-8%), but they keep boosting income of all income groups, which makes
them unnecessarily expensive (see below). However, the budgetary cost of children
allowances spend on the richer 50% of households did fall during the analyzed period. While
in 1999 more than 20% of all benefits went to the richer households, their share fell to 13-
14% in 2000-2002.
The illness and unemployment benefits are allegedly "insurance-based" but due to the
severe ceilings on these benefits, they resemble standard social security schemes. That is why
we can assess their redistribution effects. Table 4 shows that unemployment benefits are the
better targeted of the two: they typically boost income of the poorest deciles by 1-2%, and
largely ignore the rest of income groups. Illness benefits are much more spread (and
expensive - see below), as they enhance the poorest income by 6-10%, but the rest of
population gets a 2-3% bonus as well.
Table 4 also shows the distribution impact of tax deductible allowances. We can see
that the impact of tax allowances was decreasing in the period 1999-2002. While they boosted
the poorest decile´s income by 12% in 1999, the boost fell to 7.5% in 2002 and all deciles
shared the same development. Tax allowances are also, by their construction, less progressive
than social benefits. The middle deciles' incomes were increased by 4-6% and the richest
decile gained 4% in 1999 and only 2.5% in 2002. In absolute terms, though, the richest decile
is the winner as the average gain from tax credits per person in this decile was almost CZK
8,000 in 1999 and more than CZK 9,000 in 2002. The gain falls to about CZK 5,000 for the
poorest decile for the whole period.
The following charts illustrate redistribution effects of various social security schemes
graphically. Chart 3 shows how the income transfers to various deciles are structured, i.e. how
much is contributed by various social schemes. We may immediately notice the more steep
redistribution line in 2000 and 2001. The lines show impact of tax credits that will be
discussed separately.14
Chart 3: Income increases from various social schemes 1999-2002(in %)
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6. Budget costs of the social system redistribution
The Czech social security system has considerable costs that burden the public budgets.
The Table 5 shows that the total costs of various social programs increased from CZK 53bn
in 1999 to CZK 68bn in 2002, i.e. from less than 3% to 3.3% of GDP. Tax deductible
allowance represents tax expenditure of further CZK 49-52bn, i.e. about 2.5% of GDP. It is
thus of utmost importance to analyze what impact these costs have on the income
redistribution. We assess this issue by breaking up the total costs of various programs as they
are distributed to the ten deciles of households. Funds spent on the lowest decile should have
the highest "social marginal utility", while funds distributed towards well-off deciles are
thought to be less significant. Of course, this is not to say that all money distributed to, say,
five upper deciles are wasted. Some of the money will always end up with the rich. Also, in
some cases comprehensible means testing would be administratively unattainable or too
expensive. However, some of transfers to well off can be eliminated or scaled down without
any apparent loss of welfare.
The most expensive social scheme in the Table 5 is the illness benefit on which CZK
28bn was spent in 2002. The poorest decile gets most of the money distributed via the scheme
(about 25%), but significant sums (about one third) go to well-off deciles and even to the
richest decile. A radical reform of the system, perhaps based on private insurance could save
almost 34% of the costs (CZK 10bn in 2002 that went toward the five richest deciles that
surely do not need state assistance). The reform would, though, require a shift in the
government policy and would not be administratively easy.
The second most expensive program is the notorious child allowance scheme on which
CZK 12-13bn is spent annually. We discussed its arithmetic in the chapter 2, and the Table 515
only underlines the arguments raised there: the program spends about 20% on the richer half
of the Czech households. These funds may be saved without much complication, as the
program is already (poorly) means-tested, so by changing the coefficient of eligibility the
government would save CZK 2-3bn.
Other programs are less costly and generally better targeted. Both parental allowances
and social supplements are concentrated on the poorest decile and funds spent on well-off
households are probably unnecessary consequence of the program's' administration. Similarly,
unemployment benefits go predominantly towards the poorest (two poorest deciles receive
almost 50% of all benefits).
Taken together, the poorest decile gets about 40% of the total social programs´ costs
(less in 1999, more in 2000). Two poorest deciles, an alternative target group, received 46%
of the total funds distributed in 1999 and more than half of the funds in 2000-2002 period.
Should the Czech government target three deciles, as would the 1.8 of MLS threshold
suggest, the share of funds spent on these three deciles was 59% in 1999, 68% in 2000, 67%
in 2001 and 62% in 2002. Whether this share is appropriate remains an open issue.
The budget cost of the tax deductible allowances were distributed most equally across
all income deciles. Still the poorest decile’s cost of around CZK 8bn is the highest. However,
the second highest costs are associated with the richest decile: around CZK 6bn is handed to
the richest households in the Czech Republic - see table 5.16















Decile 1 2588 3727 2430 1661 2301 1456 14164 4904
Decile 2 2206 1416 2062 764 2275 1219 9942 4843
Decile 3 1777 657 1348 350 1861 765 6759 4785
Decile 4 1883 224 779 383 1734 284 5286 5219
Decile 5 1394 134 389 281 1858 420 4476 4817
Decile 6 1310 21 242 141 1367 644 3725 5210
Decile 7 750 13 150 100 1457 300 2770 4956
Decile 8 351 23 63 107 1409 257 2211 4344
Decile 9 190 21 167 172 1452 284 2285 4499
Decile 10 50 15 88 41 753 71 1018 4879















Decile 1 5978 5399 4649 3730 8261 2192 30209 8534
Decile 2 1618 512 1298 390 2168 405 6392 3596
Decile 3 1300 177 866 219 2086 666 5314 3711
Decile 4 1269 59 292 225 2060 614 4519 3956
Decile 5 972 17 147 252 1739 415 3542 4107
Decile 6 738 11 161 63 1320 320 2614 4455
Decile 7 475 10 112 73 1810 239 2718 4522
Decile 8 234 13 92 37 1775 376 2526 4637
Decile 9 121 1 18 32 1417 305 1895 5145
Decile 10 44 1 57 16 1081 146 1346 6099















Decile 1 5433 5142 4369 4111 7735 2236 29027 9407
Decile 2 2096 676 1362 820 3094 614 8661 4271
Decile 3 1311 101 831 267 2054 565 5130 4022
Decile 4 1247 59 437 207 2105 407 4462 4082
Decile 5 1017 30 330 225 1938 509 4049 4070
Decile 6 763 8 90 156 2075 237 3330 4583
Decile 7 424 0 97 182 2125 266 3095 4778
Decile 8 328 7 93 33 1826 182 2469 5041
Decile 9 106 2 48 31 1475 191 1853 5514
Decile 10 73 16 44 23 1288 21 1465 6156















Decile 1 4749 4653 3478 3179 7832 2061 25951 8012
Decile 2 2249 1040 1676 960 3394 643 9962 4616
Decile 3 1571 378 909 700 2411 661 6629 3937
Decile 4 1372 116 648 412 2500 764 5813 4103
Decile 5 1080 29 589 204 2596 623 5120 4341
Decile 6 967 10 253 268 1966 407 3872 4590
Decile 7 718 39 197 220 2219 324 3716 4766
Decile 8 400 6 154 56 1999 456 3071 5125
Decile 9 196 0 74 30 2020 209 2529 5648
Decile 10 50 0 45 27 1381 62 1565 6619
TOTAL 13353 6271 8022 6055 28318 6210 68229 5175817
7. Measuring efficiency of social programs
The efficiency of individual programs is very difficult to measure, because social
projects have different goals and are devoted to different social groups. The commonly used
approach, which is also adopted in this paper, is to concentrate on budgetary cost of
individual programs and its distribution across income groups. This approach gives us
interesting information about individual programs but it does not give us tool for their mutual
comparison.
We have tried to construct a unique efficiency measure for all social programs. Our
basic assumption is that the main objective of social policy is to help poorest groups of
population, i.e. lowest income group decile. We look at how much it costs to lift income of a
respective target group by one percentage point. If, for example child allowances, with the
total costs of CZK 12.5bn in 1999, lift income of the poorest decile by 7.6%, the cost of 1%
increase is CZK 1.6bn. If, on the other hand, parental allowances, with the total costs of CZK
8bn in 2002, boost income of the poorest deciles by 5.2%, the costs of 1% increase is CZK
1,5bn (see Table 6).
On this measure, parental allowances and social supplement are the most efficient.
Parental allowances were the most efficient in 1999-2001 period: it cost less than a billion to
lift the poorest decile's income by 1% by this benefit in 1999 and 2000. However, the parental
allowances became less efficient in 2002, as their cost jumped to 1.5bn per percentage point
of income of the poorest decile. Social supplement program needed a little more than one
billion to deliver the same boost in 1999 and 2000. This program became the most efficient in
2002: while its costs did increase, they rose to 1.35bn only.
Social supplement is, by definition, targeted at the poorest households and should serve
as a benchmark of efficiency for other programs. Relative efficiency of parental allowance
scheme follows from the fact that families with children have usually lower than average
income and it is thus “cheaper” to lift their income by 1%. If one parent stays at home to look
after children and so has right to receive parental allowance family income falls to the lowest
income groups.
17
Children allowances fare worse with costs of CZK 1.6bn in 1999 and more than 2.2bn
in 2002. Programs, which are based on “social insurance” concept, are less efficient to
increase income of the poorest population. Unemployment and illness benefits both needed
more than CZK 3bn to increase income of lowest decile by 1% in 2002.
Tax allowances are the least efficient program, measured by our proxy. It cost as much
as CZK 6bn to lift income of the poorest decile by 1%. However, as noted above, tax
deductions have other merits as well. Most importantly, they do not discourage from work
and are cheaper to administer.
                                                          
17 However, in reality some families report only one parent income while the other parent has also its own
income.18













1999 1643 1020 927 3206 2593 1557 4116
2000 1615 1026 951 3574 2412 1562 5454
2001 2120 1230 1229 3909 3745 2169 6251
2002 2209 1355 1546 3508 3077 2201 6880
8. Conclusions
Our analysis of main social benefits and tax credits impact on household income
distribution, which is monitored by Household Budget Surveys, has brought several results.
The first result seems to be that targeting of majority of social programs is quite good. More
than one third of all expenses (38% in 2002) in relation to six studied social benefits (child
allowance, parental allowance, social supplement, other social support, illness benefit, and
unemployment benefit) goes to households in the lowest income decile. Three fourth of all
expenses goes to households in the lower half of income spectrum. If we take as an example
probably the best targeted program – i.e. social supplement – targeting could be improved in a
way that upper half of richer households would get instead of 25% of social benefits only
10%. If implemented, this would save about 0.5% GDP from the state budget without
affecting households with lower than average income.
We also constructed a proxy measuring efficiency of various social programs. If we
assume that the government’s social welfare function gives dominant importance to the
poorest decile of households, it should strive to increase its income by the most efficient
programs, i.e. social supplement and parental allowances. However, when we look at the
budgetary developments in the 1999-2002 period, the Czech government aggressively
increased spending on social programs that are least efficient. Expenditures on illness benefits
jumped by more than 70% in the four-year period and expenditures on unemployment
benefits increased by 9%. These are the least efficient programs.
Expenditures on most efficient programs – social supplement and parental allowances –
stagnated. Social supplement expenditures remained constant even in nominal terms, while
parental allowances expenditures grew by 4% only. However, the government’s welfare
function remains unspecified so we can only guess which programs best reflect government’s
priorities.
Literature
Erbenová Michaela, Vít Šorm and Katherine Terrell (1996): "Work Incentive And Other
Effects Of Social Assistance And Unemployment Benefit Policy In The Czech
Republic", OECD Seminar.
Haan Peter and Viktor Steiner (2004): Distributional and Fiscal Effects of German Tax
Reform 2004: A Behavioral Microsimulation Analysis, DIW Working Paper.
Jelínek Tomáš and Ondřej Schneider (1997): Time for Pension Reform in the Czech
Republic; Pension Trouble Is Brewing in the Visegrad Countries, two articles in
Transitions, Vol.4, No.1, June 1997.
Newberry, David M.G. (ed.) (1995): Tax and Benefit Reform in Central and Eastern Europe,
CEPR, London.19
O.E.C.D. (1995) Review of Labor Market and Social Policy in the Czech Republic. Paris.
O.E.C.D. (2001) Economic Review of the Czech Republic, Paris.
Průša Ladislav (2001): Vztah dávek a daní v letech 1995-2000 a další výhled, Finance a úvěr,
12/2001, Praha.
Schneider Ondřej (2004a): Protecting People While Enhancing Work Incentives: The Role of
The Welfare System, in: Czech Republic: Ageing and Employment Policies, OECD,
Paris 2004. ISBN: 92-64-01661-9.
Schneider Ondřej (2004c): Minimum living standard and labor markets in the Czech
Republic, Working Paper 2004, Institute of Economic Studies FSV UK
Schneider Ondřej, Martin Salí and Jan Zápal (2004): Zdanění práce a kapitálu – Teorie a
aplikace na českou ekonomiku, (“Labour and Capital Taxation – Theory and
Application to the Czech economy”). Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and
Finance 2003, vol. 53, No.11/12.
Schneider Ondřej (2003): Veřejné rozpočty v České republice v 90. letech – kořeny krize,
(“Czech Public Budgets in the 90´s – Roots of a Crisis”), in Czech, Working Paper
30/2003, Institute of Economic Studies FSV UK
Schneider Ondřej, Tomáš Jelínek (2003): Vliv českého sociálního systému a daňových úlev
na rozdělení příjmů, ("Impact Of Czech Social Security System And Tax Deductible
Allowance On The Income Distribution"), in Czech and English, Finance a úvěr
12/2001.
Schneider Ondřej, Pavel Štěpánek (2001): A looming Financial Crisis in the Czech Republic,
in: Dabrowski M., Rostowski J. (eds.) The Eastern Enlargement of the EU, Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Večerník Jiří and Petr Matějů (1999): Ten Years of Rebuilding Capitalism: Czech Society
After 1989, Academia, Praha.
Večerník Jiří (1998), Občan a tržní ekonomika. Příjmy, nerovnost a politické postoje v české
společnosti, Lidové noviny, Praha.
Večerník Jiří (1996): Markets and People - The Czech Reform Experience in a Comparative
Perspective, Avebury, Aldershot, England.
World Bank (2001): Czech Republic: Enhancing the Prospects for Growth with Fiscal
Stability, World Bank, Washington D.C.Dosud vyšlo :
1.  Michal Hlaváček : Modely difuze technologií
2.  Tomáš Cahlík  : Analýza ekonomického výzkumu
3.  Vladimír Benáček: :  Autentický soukromý sektor v transitivní ekonomice: příspěvek ke hledání kořenů a
alternativ českého kapitalismu
4.  Milan Sojka : Alternativní scénáře transformační strategie československé ekonomiky na počátku 90. let a
jejich teoretická východiska
5.  Jiří Hlaváček, Michal Hlaváček : Optimum výrobce v odvětví s nikdy neklesajícími výnosy z rozsahu
6.  František Turnovec : The Czech Republic on its Way to the European Union
7.  Lubomír Mlčoch : Ekonomie důvěry
8.  Luděk Urban : Zásady společné obchodní politiky a  důsledky jejich přijetí pro českou ekonomiku
9.  Jan Ámos Víšek : Export z ČR do EU a mimo EU
10.  Miloslav S. Vošvrda : On Martingale Diffusions in Financial Markets
11.  František Turnovec :Flexible Integration and the Excessive Deficit Procedure in the EMU
12.  Jiří Hlaváček, Michal Hlaváček : Byl proces eliminace podniků ozdravnou procedurou pro české
hospodářství konce 90. let?
13.  Karel Půlpán: Hospodářský vývoj Španělska jako inspirace pro Českou republiku.
14.  Jiří Hlaváček, Michal Hlaváček : Ekonomicky racionální altruismus
15.  Jiří Kameníček : Nástroje pro popis nestandardního ekonomického chování, aplikace teorie lidského
kapitálu
16.  Jiří Hlaváček : Redistribuce : projev lidských preferencí a společenských potřeb
17.  Silvester van Koten: Transaction Cost  Economics: Basic Concepts and Extensions
18.  Hlaváček J., Hlaváček M.: Ekonomická racionalita donátora a důvěra k příjemci dotace
19.  Vladimír Benáček , Víšek Jan Ámos: Determining Factors of Competitiveness of Trade and Specialization of
Czech Industrial Sector before the EU Accession
20.  Milan Sojka, Postkeynesovská teorie peněz, peněžní a úvěrová politika a postavení centrální banky
21.  Milan Sojka, Alternativní scénáře transformační strategie československé ekonomiky na počátku 90. let a
jejich teoretická východiska
22.  František Turnovec, Economic Research and Education in the Czech Republic 1989-2000
23.  Jiří Hlaváček , Michal Hlaváček : Petrohradský paradox
24.  František Turnovec : Evaluation of National, Political and Institutional Influence in Consultation,
Cooperation and Co-decision Procedures of the EU Decision Making
25.  Karel Půlpán: Rakouský poválečný vývoj
26.  Ondřej Schneider : European Pension Systems and the EU Enlargement
27.  Martin Gregor: Mancur Olson redivivus, „Vzestup a pád národů“ a současné společenské vědy”
28.  Martin Gregor: Mancur Olson’s Addendum to New Keynesianism: Wage Stickiness Explained
29.  Patrik Nový : Olsonova teorie hospodářského cyklu ve světle empirie: návrh alternativního
metodologického přístupu
30.  Ondřej Schneider: Veřejné rozpočty v ČR v 90. letech  20. století – kořeny krize
31.  Michal Ježek: Mikroanalýza reformy českého důchodového systému
32.  Michal Hlaváček: Efektivnost pořízení a předávání informace mezi privátními subjekty s pozitivně-
extenalitní vazbou
33.  Tomáš Richter: Zástavní právo k podniku z pohledu teorie a praxe dluhového financování
34.  Vladimír Benáček: Rise of an Authentic Private Sector in an Economy of Transition: De Novo Enterprises
and their Impact on the Czech Economy
35.  Tomáš Cahlík, Soňa Pokutová, Ctirad Slavík: Human Capital Mobility
36.  Tomáš Cahlík, Jakub Sovina: Konvergence a soutěžní výhody ČR
37.  Ondřej Schneider, Petr Hedbávný: Fiscal Policy: Too Political?
38.  Jiří Havel: Akcionářská demokracie „Czech made“
39.  Jiří Hlaváček, Michal Hlaváček: K mikroekonomickému klimatu v ČR na začátku 21.století: kartel prodejců
pohonných hmot? (případová studie)
40.  Karel Janda: Credit Guarantees in a Credit Market with Adverse Selection
41.  Lubomír Mlčoch: Společné dobro pro ekonomiku: národní, evropské, globální
42.  Karel Půlpán: Hospodářský vývoj Německa jako inspirace pro Česko43.  Milan Sojka: Czech Transformation Strategy and its Economic Consequences: A Case of an Institutional
Failure
44.  Luděk Urban: Lisabonská strategie, její hlavní směry a nástroje.
45.  Jiří Hlaváček, Michal Hlaváček: Models of Economically Rational Donators
46.  Karel Kouba, Ondřej Vychodil, Jitka Roberts: Privatizace bez kapitálu.
47.  František Turnovec: Economic Research in the Czech Republic: Entering International Academic Marke.t
48.  František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, Mariusz Mazurkiewicz: Power Indices: Shapley-Shubik or Penrose-
Banzhaf?
49.  Vladimír Benáček: Current Account Developments in Central, Baltic and South-Eastern Europe in the  Pre-
enlargement Period in 2002-2003
50.  Vladimír Benáček: External FInancing and FDI in Central, Baltic and South-Eastern Europe during 2002-
2003
51.  Tomáš Cahlík, Soňa Pokutová, Ctirad Slavík: Human Capital Mobility II
52.  Karel Diviš, Petr Teplý: Informační efektivnost burzovních trhů ve střední Evropě
53.  František Turnovec: Česká ekonomická věda na mezinárodním akademickém trhu: měření vědeckého
kapitálu vysokoškolských a dalších výzkumných pracovišť
54.  Karel Půlpán: Měnové plánování za reálného socialismu
55.  Petr Hedbávný, Ondřej Schneider, Jan Zápal: Does the Enlarged European Union Need a Better Fiscal
Pact?
56.  Martin Gregor: Governing Fiscal Commons in the Enlarged European Union.
57.  Michal Mejstřík: Privatizace, regulace a deregulace utilit v EU a ČR: očekávání a fakta
58.  Ilona Bažantová: České centrální bankovnictví po vstup České republiky do Evropské unie (právně
institucionální pohled)
59.  Jiří Havel: Dilemata českého dozoru finančních trhů.
60.  Irena Jindřichovská: Response of Regulatory Bodies to FInancial Crises: Role of Auditors and International
Comparison
61.  Karel Janda: Bankruptcy Procedures with Ex Post Moral Hazard
62.  Ondřej Knot, Ondřej Vychodil: What Drives the Optimal Bankruptcy Law Design
63.  Jiří Hlaváček, Michal Hlaváček: Models of Economically Rational Donators: Altruism Can Be Cruel
64.  Aleš Bulíř, Kateřina Šmídková: Would Fast Sailing towards the Euro Be Smooth? What Fundamental Real
Exchange Rates Tell Us about Acceding Economies?
65.  Gabriela Hrubá: Rozložení daňového břemene mezi české domácnosti: přímé daně
66.  Gabriela Hrubá: Rozložení daňového břemene mezi české domácnosti: nepřímé daně
      
Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Fakulta sociálních věd,
Institut ekonomických studií [UK FSV – IES]  Praha 1, Opletalova 26.
E-mail : ies@mbox.fsv.cuni.cz        http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz